Court Rules Federal Reserve is Privately Owned
Case Reveals Fed's Status as a Private Institution
Below are excerpts from a court case proving the Federal
Reserve system's status. As you will see, the court ruled that
the Federal Reserve Banks are "independent, privately
owned and locally controlled corporations", and there is
not sufficient "federal government control over 'detailed
physical performance' and 'day to day operation'" of the
Federal Reserve Bank for it to be considered a federal agency:
Lewis v. United States, 680 F.2d 1239 (1982)
John L. Lewis, Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
United States of America, Defendant/Appellee.
No. 80-5905
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted March 2, 1982.
Decided April 19, 1982.
As Amended June 24, 1982.
Plaintiff, who was injured by vehicle owned and operated by
a federal reserve bank, brought action alleging jurisdiction
under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The United States District
Court for the Central District of California, David W.
Williams, J., dismissed holding that federal reserve bank was
not a federal agency within meaning of Act and that the court
therefore lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Appeal was
taken. The Court of Appeals, Poole, Circuit Judge, held that
federal reserve banks are not federal instrumentalities for
purposes of the Act, but are independent, privately owned and
locally controlled corporations.
Affirmed.
1. United States
There are no sharp criteria for determining whether an
entity is a federal agency within meaning of the Federal Tort
Claims Act, but critical factor is existence of federal
government control over "detailed physical
performance" and "day to day operation" of an
entity. . . .
2. United States
Federal reserve banks are not federal instrumentalities for
purposes of a Federal Tort Claims Act, but are independent,
privately owned and locally controlled corporations in light
of fact that direct supervision and control of each bank is
exercised by board of directors, federal reserve banks, though
heavily regulated, are locally controlled by their member
banks, banks are listed neither as "wholly owned"
government corporations nor as "mixed ownership"
corporations; federal reserve banks receive no appropriated
funds from Congress and the banks are empowered to sue and be
sued in their own names. . . .
3. United States
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, federal liability is
narrowly based on traditional agency principles and does not
necessarily lie when a tortfeasor simply works for an entity,
like the Reserve Bank, which performs important activities for
the government. . . .
4. Taxation
The Reserve Banks are deemed to be federal
instrumentalities for purposes of immunity from state
taxation.
5. States Taxation
Tests for determining whether an entity is federal
instrumentality for purposes of protection from state or local
action or taxation, is very broad: whether entity performs
important governmental function.
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Lafayette L. Blair, Compton, Cal., for plaintiff/appellant.
James R. Sullivan, Asst. U.S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal.,
argued, for defendant/appellee; Andrea Sheridan Ordin, U.S.
Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., on brief.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of California.
Before Poole and Boochever, Circuit Judges, and Soloman,
District Judge. (The Honorable Gus J. Solomon, Senior District
Judge for the District of Oregon, sitting by designation)
Poole, Circuit Judge:
On July 27, 1979, appellant John Lewis was injured by a
vehicle owned and operated by the Los Angeles branch of the
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. Lewis brought this
action in district court alleging jurisdiction under the
Federal Tort Clains Act (the Act), 28 U.S.C. Sect. 1346(b).
The United States moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The district court dismissed, holding that the
Federal Reserve Bank is not a federal agency within the
meaning of the Act and that the court therefore lacked subject
matter jurisdiction. We affirm.
In enacting the Federal Tort Claims Act, Congress provided
a limited waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United
States for certain torts of federal employees. . . .
Specifically, the Act creates liability for injuries
"caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission" of an employee of any federal agency acting
within the scope of his office or employment. . . .
"Federal agency" is defined as:
the executive departments, the military departments, independent
establishments of the United States, and corporations acting
primarily as instrumentalities of the United States, but does not
include any contractors with the United States.
28 U.S.C. Sect. 2671. The liability of the United States
for the negligence of a Federal Reserve Bank employee depends,
therefore, on whether the Bank is a federal agency under Sect.
2671.
[1,2] There are no sharp criteria for determining whether
an entity is a federal agency within the meaning of the Act,
but the critical factor is the existence of federal government
control over the "detailed physical performance" and
"day to day operation" of that entity. . . . Other
factors courts have considered include whether the entity is
an independent corporation . . ., whether the government is
involved in the entity's finances. . . ., and whether the
mission of the entity furthers the policy of the United
States, . . . Examining the organization and function of the
Federal Reserve Banks, and applying the relevant factors, we
conclude that the Reserve Banks are not federal
instrumentalities for purpose of the FTCA, but are
independent, privately owned and locally controlled
corporations.
Each Federal Reserve Bank is a separate corporation owned
by commercial banks in its region. The stockholding commercial
banks elect two thirds of each Bank's nine member board of
directors. The remaining three directors are appointed by the
Federal Reserve Board. The Federal Reserve Board regulates the
Reserve Banks, but direct supervision and control of each Bank
is exercised by its board of directors. 12 U.S.C. Sect. 301.
The directors enact by-laws regulating the manner of
conducting general Bank business, 12 U.S.C. Sect. 341, and
appoint officers to implement and supervise daily Bank
activities. These activites include collecting and clearing
checks, making advances to private and commercial entities,
holding reserves for member banks, discounting the notes of
member banks, and buying and selling securities on the open
market. See 12 U.S.C. Sub-Sect. 341-361.
Each Bank is statutorily empowered to conduct these
activites without day to day direction from the federal
government. Thus, for example, the interest rates on advances
to member banks, individuals, partnerships, and corporations
are set by each Reserve Bank and their decisions regarding the
purchase and sale of securities are likewise independently
made.
It is evident from the legislative history of the Federal
Reserve Act that Congress did not intend to give the federal
government direction over the daily operation of the Reserve
Banks:
It is proposed that the Government shall retain sufficient power over
the reserve banks to enable it to exercise a direct authority when
necessary to do so, but that it shall in no way attempt to carry on
through its own mechanism the routine operations and banking which
require detailed knowledge of local and individual credit and which
determine the funds of the community in any given instance. In other
words, the reserve-bank plan retains to the Government power over the
exercise of the broader banking functions, while it leaves to
individuals and privately owned institutions the actual direction of
routine.
H.R. Report No. 69 Cong. 1st Sess. 18-19 (1913).
The fact that the Federal Reserve Board regulates the
Reserve Banks does not make them federal agencies under the
Act. In United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 96 S.Ct. 1971,
48 L.Ed.2d 390 (1976), the Supreme Court held that a community
action agency was not a federal agency or instrumentality for
purposes of the Act, even though the agency was organized
under federal regulations and heavily funded by the federal
government. Because the agency's day to day operation was not
supervised by the federal government, but by local officials,
the Court refused to extend federal tort liability for the
negligence of the agency's employees. Similarly, the Federal
Reserve Banks, though heavily regulated, are locally
controlled by their member banks. Unlike typical federal
agencies, each bank is empowered to hire and fire employees at
will. Bank employees do not participate in the Civil Service
Retirement System. They are covered by worker's compensation
insurance, purchased by the Bank, rather than the Federal
Employees Compensation Act. Employees travelling on Bank
business are not subject to federal travel regulations and do
not receive government employee discounts on lodging and
services.
The Banks are listed neither as "wholly owned"
government corporations under 31 U.S.C. Sect. 846 nor as
"mixed ownership" corporations under 31 U.S.C. Sect.
856, a factor considered is Pearl v. United States, 230 F.2d
243 (10th Cir. 1956), which held that the Civil Air Patrol is
not a federal agency under the Act. Closely resembling the
status of the Federal Reserve Bank, the Civil Air Patrol is a
non-profit, federally chartered corporation organized to serve
the public welfare. But because Congress' control over the
Civil Air Patrol is limited and the corporation is not
designated as a wholly owned or mixed ownership government
corporation under 31 U.S.C. Sub-Sect. 846 and 856, the court
concluded that the corporation is a non-governmental,
independent entity, not covered under the Act.
Additionally, Reserve Banks, as privately owned entities,
receive no appropriated funds from Congress. . . .
Finally, the Banks are empowered to sue and be sued in
their own name. 12 U.S.C. Sect. 341. They carry their own
liability insurance and typically process and handle their own
claims. In the past, the Banks have defended against tort
claims directly, through private counsel, not government
attorneys . . ., and they have never been required to settle
tort claims under the administrative procedure of 28 U.S.C.
Sect. 2672. The waiver of sovereign immunity contained in the
Act would therefore appear to be inapposite to the Banks who
have not historically claimed or received general immunity
from judicial process.
[3] The Reserve Banks have properly been held to be federal
instrumentalities for some purposes. In United States v.
Hollingshead, 672 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1982), this court held
that a Federal Reserve Bank employee who was responsible for
recommending expenditure of federal funds was a "public
official" under the Federal Bribery Statute. That statute
broadly defines public official to include any person acting
"for or on behalf of the Government." . . . The test
for determining status as a public official turns on whether
there is "substantial federal involvement" in the
defendant's activities. United States v. Hollingshead, 672
F.2d at 754. In contrast, under the FTCA, federal liability is
narrowly based on traditional agency principles and does not
necessarily lie when the tortfeasor simply works for an
entity, like the Reserve Banks, which perform important
activities for the government.
[4, 5] The Reserve Banks are deemed to be federal
instrumentalities for purposes of immunity from state
taxation. . . . The test for determining whether an entity is
a federal instrumentality for purposes of protection from
state or local action or taxation, however, is very broad:
whether the entity performs an important governmental
function. . . . The Reserve Banks, which further the nation's
fiscal policy, clearly perform an important governmental
function.
Performance of an important governmental function, however,
is but a single factor and not determinative in tort claims
actions. . . . State taxation has traditionally been viewed as
a greater obstacle to an entity's ability to perform federal
functions than exposure to judicial process; therefore tax
immunity is liberally applied. . . . Federal tort liability,
however, is based on traditional agency principles and thus
depends upon the principal's ability to control the actions of
his agent, and not simply upon whether the entity performs an
important governmental function. . . .
Brinks Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 466 F.Supp. 116 (D.D.C.1979), held that a Federal
Reserve Bank is a federal instrumentality for purposes of the
Service Contract Act, 41 U.S.C. Sect. 351. Citing Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston and Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis, the court applied the "important
governmental function" test and concluded that the term
"Federal Government" in the Service Contract Act
must be "liberally construed to effectuate the Act's
humanitarian purpose of providing minimum wage and fringe
benefit protection to individuals performing contracts with
the federal government." Id. 288 Mich. at 120, 284 N.W.2d
667.
Such a liberal construction of the term "federal
agency" for purposes of the Act is unwarranted. Unlike in
Brinks, plaintiffs are not without a forum in which to seek a
remedy, for they may bring an appropriate state tort claim
directly against the Bank; and if successful, their prospects
of recovery are bright since the institutions are both highly
solvent and amply insured.
For these reasons we hold that the Reserve Banks are not
federal agencies for purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act
and we affirm the judgement of the district court.
AFFIRMED.
It is clear from this that in some circumstances, the
Federal Reserve Bank can be considered a government
"instrumentality", but cannot be considered a
"federal agency", because the term carries with it
the assumption that the federal government has direct
oversight over what the Fed does. Of course it does not,
because most people who know about this subject know that the
Fed is "politically independent."
The only area where one might disagree with the judge's
decision is where he states that the Fed furthers the federal
government's fiscal policy, and therefore performs an
important governmental function. While we would like to think
that the federal government and the Fed work cooperatively
with each other, and they may on occasion, the Fed is by no
means required to do so. One example is where Rep. Wright
Patman, Chairman of the House Banking Committee, said in the
Congressional Record back in the '60s, that depending on the
temperament of the Fed's Chairman, sometimes the Fed worked
with the government's fiscal policy, and other times either
went in the complete opposite direction, or threatens to do so
in order to influence policy.
The common claim that the Fed is accountable to the
government, because it is required to report to Congress on
its activities annually, is incorrect. The reports to Congress
mean little unless what the Chairman reports can be verified
by complete records. From its founding to this day, the Fed
has never undergone a complete independent audit. Congress
time after time has requested that the Fed voluntarily submit
to a complete audit, and every time, it refuses.
Those in the know about the Fed, realize that it does
keep certain records secret. The soon-to-be-former Chairman of
the House Banking Committee, Henry Gonzales, has spoken on
record repeatedly about how the Fed at one point says it does
not have certain requested records, and then it is found
through investigation that it in fact does have those records,
or at least used to. It would appear that the Fed Chairman can
say anything he wants to to Congress, and they'll have to
accept what he says, because verification of what he says is
not always possible.
[END]
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