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[INTRO]
NORMAN
DODD:
Rowan Gaither was at that time president of the Ford
Foundation. Mr. Gaither had sent for me when I found
it convenient to be in New York, asked me to call upon
him at his office, which I did, and on arrival after a
few amenities, Mr. Gaither said: �Mr. Dodd, we've
asked you to come up here today because we thought
that possibly, off the record, you would tell us why
the Congress is interested in the activities of the
foundations such as ourselves.� Before I could think
of how I would reply to that statement, Mr. Gaither
then went on and said: �Mr. Dodd, all of us who have
a hand in the making of policies here have had
experience operating under directives, the substance
of which is that we shall use our grant-making power
so to alter life in the United States that it can be
comfortably merged with the Soviet Union.�
ANNOUNCER:
Warning! You are about to enter The Reality Zone, a
place where truth is stranger than fiction, where
knowledge is king, where myths are shattered, and
deceptions exposed. It's a place where the lessons of
history are found and where true-life adventures
reveal the hidden nature of man. If you proceed, you
will not be able to return to the twilight zone from
which you came. You have five seconds remaining to
escape.
ED
GRIFFIN
:
Welcome to The Reality Zone. I'm Ed Griffin. The story
we are about to hear represents a missing piece in the
puzzle of modern history. We are about to hear a man
tell us that the major tax-exempt foundations of
America since at least 1945 have been operating to
promote a hidden agenda, and that agenda has nothing
to do with the surface appearance of charity, good
works, or philanthropy. This man will tell you that
the real objective has been to influence American
educational institutions and to control foreign policy
of the federal government. The purpose of this control
has been to condition Americans to accept the creation
of world government. That government is to be based on
the principle of collectivism, which is another way of
saying socialism, and it is to be ruled from behind
the scenes by those same interests which control the
tax-exempt foundations. Is this a believable scenario?
Well, the man who tells this story is none other than
Mr. Norman Dodd, who in 1954 was the staff director of
the Congressional Special Committee to Investigate
Tax-exempt Foundations, sometimes referred to as the
Reece Committee, in recognition of its chairman,
Congressman Carol Reece. The interview we are about to
hear was conducted by me in 1982. I had no immediate
use for the material at that time, but I realized that
Mr. Dodd's story was of great importance, and since he
was advanced in age and not in good health, I wanted
to capture his recollections on videotape while he was
still with us. It was a wise decision, because Mr.
Dodd did pass away just a short time afterwards. In
later years there was a resurgence of interest in Mr.
Dodd's story, and we released the videotape to the
public in 1991. And so what now follows is the
soundtrack taken from the full, unedited interview,
broken occasionally only for a tape change or to omit
the sound of a passing airplane. It stands on its own
as an important piece in the puzzle of modern history.
(THE
INTERVIEW FOLLOWS)
ED
GRIFFIN
:
Mr. Dodd, let's begin this interview with a brief
statement. For the record, please tell us who you are,
what is your background and your qualifications to
speak on this subject.
NORMAN
DODD:
Well, Mr. Griffin, as to who I am, I am just, as the
name implies, an individual born in New Jersey and
educated in private schools, eventually in a school
called Andover in Massachusetts and then Yale
university. Running through my whole period of being
brought up and growing up, I have been an
indefatigable reader. I have had one major interest,
and that was this country as I was lead to believe it
was originally founded. I entered the world of
business knowing absolutely nothing about how that
world operated, and realized that the only way to find
out what that world consisted of would be to become
part of it. I then acquired some experience in the
manufacturing world and then in the world of
international communication and finally chose banking
as the field I wished to devote my life to. I was
fortunate enough to secure a position in one of the
important banks in
New York
and lived there. I lived through the conditions which
led up to what is known as the crash of 1929. I
witnessed what was tantamount to the collapse of the
structure of the
United States
as a whole.
Much to my surprise, I was confronted by my superiors
in the middle of the panic in which they were
immersed. I was confronted with the question: �Norm,
what do we do now?� I was thirty at the time and I
had no more right to have an answer to that question
than the man in the moon. However, I did manage to say
to my superiors: �Gentlemen, you take this
experience as proof that there's something you do not
know about banking, and you'd better go find out what
that something is and act accordingly.� Four days
later I was confronted by the same superiors with a
statement to the effect that, �Norm, you go find
out.� And I really was fool enough to accept that
assignment, because it meant that you were going out
to search for something, and nobody could tell you
what you were looking for, but I felt so strongly on
the subject that I consented.
I was relieved of all normal duties inside the bank
and two-and-half years later I felt that it was
possible to report back to those who had given me this
assignment. And so, I rendered such a report; and, as
a result of the report I rendered. I was told the
following: �Norm, what you're saying is we should
return to sound banking,� and I said, �Yes, in
essence, that's exactly what I�m saying.�
Whereupon I got my first shock, which was a statement
from them to this effect: �We will never see sound
banking in the
United States
again.� They cited chapter and verse to support that
statement, and what they cited was as follows:
�Since the end of world war one we have been
responsible for what they call the institutionalizing
of conflicting interests, and they are so prevalent
inside this country that they can never be
resolved.�
This came to me as an extraordinary shock because the
men who made this statement were men who were deemed
as the most prominent bankers in the country. The bank
of which I was a part, which I�ve spoken of, was a
Morgan bank and, coming from men of that caliber, a
statement of that kind made a tremendous impression on
me. The type of impression that it made on me was such
that I wondered if I, as an individual and what they
call a junior officer of the bank, could with the same
enthusiasm foster the progress and policies of the
bank. I spent about a year trying to think this out
and came to the conclusion that I would have to
resign.
I did resign; and, as a consequence of that, had this
experience. When my letter of resignation reached the
desk of the president of the bank, he sent for me, and
I came to visit with him, and he stated to me:
�Norm, I have your letter, but I don't believe you
understand what's happened in the last 10 days.� And
I said, �No, Mr. Cochran, I have no idea what's
happened.� �Well,� he said, �the directors
have never been able to get your report to them out of
their mind; and, as a result, they have decided that
you as an individual must begin at once and you must
reorganize this bank in keeping with your own
ideas.� He then said, �Now, can I tear up your
letter?� Inasmuch as what had been said to me was
offering me, at the age of by then 33, about as fine
an opportunity for service to the country as I could
imagine, I said yes. They said they wished me to begin
at once, and I did.
Suddenly, in the span of about six weeks, I was not
permitted to do another piece of work and, every time
I brought the subject up, I was kind of patted on the
back and told, �Stop worrying about it, Norm. Pretty
soon you'll be a vice president, and you'll have quite
a handsome salary and ultimately be able to retire on
a very worthwhile pension. In the meantime you can
play golf and tennis to your heart's content on
weekends.� Well, Mr. Griffin, I found I couldn't do
it. I spent a year figuratively with my feet on the
desk doing nothing and I couldn't adjust to it so I
did resign and, this time, my resignation stuck.
Then I got my second shock, which was the discovery
that the doors of every bank in the
United States
were closed to me, and I never could again get a job,
as it were, in the banks. I found myself, for the
first time since I graduated from college, out of a
job.
From there on I followed various branches of the
financial world, ranging from investment counsel to
membership of the stock exchange and finally ended as
an adviser to a few individuals who had capital funds
to look after. In the meantime, my major interest
became very specific, which was to endeavor by some
means of getting the educational world to actually you
might say teach the subject of economics realistically
and move it away from the support of various
speculative activities that characterize our country.
I have had that interest, and you know how, as you
generate a specific interest, you find yourself
gravitating toward persons with similar interests, and
ultimately I found myself in the center of the world
of dissatisfaction with the directions that this
country was headed. I found myself in contact with
many individuals who on their own had done a vast
amount of studying and research in areas, which were
part of the problem.
ED
GRIFFIN
:
At what point in your career did you become connected
with the Reece Committee?
NORMAN
DODD:
1953.
ED
GRIFFIN
:
And what was that capacity, sir?
NORMAN
DODD:
That was in the capacity of what they called Director
of Research.
ED
GRIFFIN
:
Can you tell us what the Reece Committee was
attempting to do?
NORMAN
DODD:
Yes, I can tell you. It was operating and carrying out
instructions embodied in a resolution passed by the
House of Representatives, which was to investigate the
activities of foundations as to whether or not these
activities could justifiably be labeled un-American
without, I might say, defining what they meant by
"un-American". That was the resolution, and
the committee had then the task of selecting a
counsel, and the counsel in turn had the task of
selecting a staff, and he had to have somebody who
would direct the work of that staff, and that was what
they meant by the Director of Research.
ED
GRIFFIN
:
What were some of the details, the specifics that you
told the Committee at that time?
NORMAN
DODD:
Well, Mr. Griffin, in that report I specifically,
number one, defined what, to us, was meant by the
phrase, "un-American." We defined that in
our way as being a determination to effect changes in
the country by unconstitutional means. We have plenty
of constitutional procedures, assuming we wish to
effect a change in the form of government and that
sort of thing; and, therefore, any effort in that
direction which did not avail itself of the procedures
which were authorized by the Constitution could be
justifiably be called un-American. That was the start
of educating them up to that particular point. The
next thing was to educate them as to the effect on the
country as a whole of the activities of large, endowed
foundations over the then-past forty years.
ED
GRIFFIN
:
What was that effect?
NORMAN
DODD:
That effect was to orient our educational system away
from support of the principles embodied in the
Declaration of Independence and implemented in the
Constitution; and the task now was the orientation of
education away from these briefly stated principles
and self-evident truths. That's what had been the
effect of the wealth, which constituted the endowments
of those foundations that had been in existence over
the largest portion of this span of 50 years, and
holding them responsible for this change. What we were
able to bring forward, what we uncovered, was the
determination of these large endowed foundations,
through their trustees, to actually get control over
the content of American education.
ED
GRIFFIN
:
There's quite a bit of publicity given to your
conversation with Rowan Gaither. Would you please tell
us who he was and what was that conversation you had
with him?
NORMAN
DODD:
Rowan Gaither was, at that time, president of the Ford
Foundation. Mr. Gaither had sent for me when I found
it convenient to be in
New York
, asked me to call upon him at his office, which I
did. Upon arrival, after a few amenities, Mr. Gaither
said: �Mr. Dodd, we've asked you to come up here
today because we thought that possibly, off the
record, you would tell us why the Congress is
interested in the activities of foundations such as
ourselves?� Before I could think of how I would
reply to that statement, Mr. Gaither then went on
voluntarily and said:
�Mr.
Dodd, all of us who have a hand in the making of
policies here have had experience either with the
OSS
during the war or the European Economic Administration
after the war. We've had experience operating under
directives, and these directives emanate and did
emanate from the White House. Now, we still operate
under just such directives. Would you like to know
what the substance of these directives is?�
I said, �Mr. Gaither, I�d like very much to
know,� whereupon he made this statement to me:
�Mr. Dodd, we are here operate in response to
similar directives, the substance of which is that we
shall use our grant-making power so to alter life in
the United States that it can be comfortably merged
with the Soviet Union.�
Well,
parenthetically, Mr. Griffin, I nearly fell off the
chair. I, of course didn't, but my response to Mr.
Gaither then was: �Well, Mr. Gaither I can now
answer your first question. You've forced the Congress
of the
United States
to spend $150,000 to find out what you've just told
me.� I said: �Of course, legally, you're entitled
to make grants for this purpose, but I don't think
you're entitled to withhold that information from the
people of the country to whom you're indebted for your
tax exemption, so why don't you tell the people of the
country what you just told me?� And his answer was,
�We would not think of doing any such thing.� So
then I said, �Well, Mr. Gaither, obviously you've
forced the Congress to spend this money in order to
find out what you've just told me.�
ED
GRIFFIN
:
Mr. Dodd, you have spoken before about some
interesting things that were discovered by Katherine
Casey at the Carnegie Endowment. Can you tell us that
story, please?
NORMAN
DODD:
Yes, I�d be glad to, Mr. Griffin. This experience
that you just referred to came about in response to a
letter that I had written to the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, asking certain questions and
gathering certain information. On the arrival of that
letter, Dr. Johnson, who was then president of the
Carnegie Endowment, telephoned me and said, did I ever
come up to New York. I said yes, I did more or less
each weekend, and he said, �Well, when you're next
here, will you drop in and see us?� Which I did.
On arrival at the office of the endowment I found
myself in the presence of Dr. Joseph Johnson, the
president, who was the successor to Alger Hiss, two
vice presidents, and their own counsel, a partner in
the firm of Sullivan and Cromwell. Dr. Johnson said,
after again amenities, Mr. Dodd, we have your letter.
We can answer all those questions, but it would be a
great deal of trouble, and we have a counter
suggestion. Our counter suggestion is: If you can
spare a member of your staff for two weeks and send
that member up to New York, we will give to that
member a room in the library and the minute books of
this foundation since its inception, and we think that
whatever you want to find out or that Congress wants
to find out will be obvious from those minutes.
Well, my first reaction was they'd lost their minds. I
had a pretty good idea of what those minutes would
contain, but I realized that Dr. Johnson had only been
in office two years, and the other vice presidents
were relatively young men, and counsel seemed to be
also a young man, and I guessed that probably they'd
never read the minutes themselves. So I said I had
somebody; I would accept their offer.
I went back to
Washington
and I selected a member of my staff who had been a
practicing attorney in
Washington
. She was on my staff to see to it that I didn't break
any congressional procedures or rules, in addition to
which she was unsympathetic to the purpose of the
investigation. She was level-headed and a very
reasonably brilliant, capable lady. Her attitude
toward the investigation was: What could possibly be
wrong with foundations� They do so much good.
Well, in the face of that sincere conviction of
Katherine's I went out of my way not to prejudice her
in any way, but I did explain to her that she couldn't
possibly cover 50 years of written minutes in two
weeks, so she would have to do what we call spot
reading. I blocked out certain periods of time to
concentrate on, and off she went to
New York
. She came back at the end of two weeks with the
following on dictaphone tapes:
We are now at the year 1908, which was the year that
the Carnegie Foundation began operations. In that
year, the trustees, meeting for the first time, raised
a specific question, which they discussed throughout
the balance of the year in a very learned fashion. The
question is: �Is there any means known more
effective than war, assuming you wish to alter the
life of an entire people?� And they conclude that no
more effective means than war to that end is known to
humanity.
So then, in
1909, they raised the second question and discussed
it, namely: �How do we involve the
United States
in a war?�
Well, I
doubt at that time if there was any subject more
removed from the thinking of most of the people of
this country than its involvement in a war. There were
intermittent shows in the Balkans, but I doubt very
much if many people even knew where the Balkans were.
Then, finally, they answered that question as follows:
�We must control the State Department.� That very
naturally raises the question of how do we do that�
And they answer it by saying: �We must take over and
control the diplomatic machinery of this country.�
And, finally, they resolve to aim at that as an
objective.
Then time
passes, and we are eventually in a war, which would be
World War I. At that time they record on their minutes
a shocking report in which they dispatched to
President Wilson a telegram, cautioning him to see
that the war does not end too quickly.
Finally, of
course, the war is over. At that time their interest
shifts over to preventing what they call a reversion
of life in the
United States
to what it was prior to 1914 when World War I broke
out. At that point they came to the conclusion that,
to prevent a reversion, �we must control education
in the
United States
.� They realize that that's a pretty big task. It is
too big for them alone, so they approach the
Rockefeller Foundation with the suggestion that that
portion of education which could be considered
domestic be handled by the Rockefeller Foundation and
that portion which is international should be handled
by the Endowment. They then decide that the key to
success of these two operations lay in the alteration
of the teaching of American history.
So they
approach four of the then-most prominent teachers of
American history in the country �people like Charles
and Mary Byrd � and their suggestion to them is:
will they alter the manner in which they present their
subject� And they got turned down flat. So they then
decide that it is necessary for them to do as they
say, �build our own stable of historians.�
Then they
approach the Guggenheim Foundation, which specializes
in fellowships, and say: �When we find young men in
the process of studying for doctorates in the field of
American history and we feel that they are the right
caliber, will you grant them fellowships on our
say-so?� And the answer is yes. So, under that
condition, eventually they assembled assemble twenty,
and they take this twenty potential teachers of
American history to
London
, and there they're briefed on what is expected of
them when, as, and if they secure appointments in
keeping with the doctorates they will have earned.
That group of twenty historians ultimately becomes the
nucleus of the American Historical Association.
Toward the
end of the 1920's, the Endowment grants to the
American Historical Association $400,000 for a study
of our history in a manner which points to what can
this country look forward to in the future. That
culminates in a seven-volume study, the last volume of
which is, of course, in essence a summary of the
contents of the other six. The essence of the last
volume is: The future of this country belongs to
collectivism administered with characteristic American
efficiency. That's the story that ultimately grew out
of and, of course, was what could have been presented
by the members of this Congressional committee to the
congress as a whole for just exactly what it said.
They never got to that point.
ED
GRIFFIN
:
This is the story that emerged from the minutes of the
Carnegie Endowment?
NORMAN
DODD:
That's right. It was official to that extent.
ED
GRIFFIN
:
Katherine Casey brought all of these back in the form
of dictated notes from a verbatim reading of the
minutes?
NORMAN
DODD:
On dictaphone belts.
ED
GRIFFIN
:
Are those in existence today?
NORMAN
DODD:
I don't know. If they are, they're somewhere in the
Archives under the control of the Congress, House of
Representatives.
ED
GRIFFIN
:
How many people actually heard those, or were they
typed up, a transcript made of them?
NORMAN
DODD:
No.
ED
GRIFFIN
:
How many people actually heard those recordings?
NORMAN
DODD:
Oh, three maybe. Myself, my top assistant, and
Katherine. I might tell you, this experience, as far
as its impact on Katherine Casey was concerned, was
she never was able to return to her law practice. If
it hadn't been for Carol Reece's ability to tuck her
away into a job in the Federal Trade Commission, I
don't know what would have happened to Katherine.
Ultimately, she lost her mind as a result of it. It
was a terrible shock. It's a very rough experience to
encounter proof of these kinds.
ED
GRIFFIN
:
Mr. Dodd can you summarize the opposition to the
Committee, the Reece Committee and particularly the
efforts to sabotaging the Committee?
NORMAN
DODD:
Well, they began right at the start of the work of an
operating staff, Mr. Griffin, and it began on the day
in which the Committee met for the purpose of
consenting to or confirming my appointment to the
position of Director of Research. Thanks to the
abstention of the minority members of the committee,
that is, the two Democratic members, from voting,
technically I was unanimously appointed.
ED
GRIFFIN
:
Wasn't the White House involved in opposition?
NORMAN
DODD:
Not at this particular point, sir. Mr. Reece ordered
counsel and myself to visit Wayne Hayes. Wayne Hayes
was the ranking minority member of the Committee as a
Democrat, so we came to him, and I had to go down to
Mr. Hayes's office, which I did. Mr. Hayes greeted us
with the flat statement directed primarily to me,
which was that �I am opposed to this investigation.
I regard it as nothing but an effort on the part of
Carol Reece to gain a little prominence, so I'll do
everything I can to see that it fails.� Well, I have
a strange personality in that a challenge of that
nature interests me. Our counsel withdrew. He went
over and sat on the couch in Mr. Reece's office and
pouted, but I sort of took up this statement of Hayes
as a challenge and set myself the goal of winning him
over to our point of view. I started by noticing on
his desk that there was a book, and the book was of
the type that �there were many in these days �
that would be complaining about the spread of
Communism in
Hungary
, that type of book. This meant to me at least he has
read a book, and so I brought up the subject of the
spread of the influence of the Soviet world. For two
hours, I discussed this with Hayes and finally ended
up with his rising from his desk and saying: �Norm,
if you will carry this investigation toward the goal
as you have outlined to me, I'll be your biggest
supporter.� I said: �Mr. Hayes, I can assure you
that I will not double-cross you.�
Subsequently Mr. Hayes sent word to me that he was in
Bethesda
Hospital
with an attack of ulcers, but would I come and see
him, which I did. He then said: �Norm, the only
reason I�ve asked you to come out here is I just
want to hear you say again you will not double-cross
me.� I gave him that assurance, and that was the
basis of our relationship. Meantime, counsel took the
attitude expressed in these words: �Norm, if you
want to waste your time with this guy,� as he called
him, �you go ahead and do it, but don't ever ask me
to say anything to him under any conditions on any
subject.� So, in a sense, that created a context for
me to operate in relation to Hayes on my own. As time
passed, Hayes offered friendship, which I hesitated to
accept because of his vulgarity, and I didn't want to
get mixed up with him socially under any conditions.
Well, that was our relationship for about three
months, and then, eventually, I had occasion to add to
my staff a top-flight intelligence officer. Both the
Republican National Committee and the White House were
resorted to, to stop me from continuing this
investigation in the directions Carol Reece had
personally asked me to do, which was to utilize this
investigation, Mr. Griffin, to uncover the fact that
this country had been the victim of a conspiracy. That
was Mr. Reece's conviction. I eventually agreed to
carry it out. I explained to Mr. Reece that Hayes's
own counsel wouldn't go in that direction. He gave me
permission to disregard their counsel, and I had then
to set up an aspect of the investigation outside of
our office, more or less secret. The Republican
National Committee got wind of what I was doing and
they did everything they could to stop me. They
appealed to counsel to stop me, and finally they
resorted to the White House.
ED
GRIFFIN
:
Was their objection because of what you were doing or
because of the fact that you were doing it outside of
the official auspices of the Committee?
NORMAN
DODD:
No, their objection was, as they put it, my devotion
to what they called anti-semitism. That was a cooked
up idea. In other words, it wasn't true at all, but
anyway, that's the way they expressed it.
ED
GRIFFIN
:
Why did they do that? How could they say that?
NORMAN
DODD:
Well, they could say it, Mr. Griffin, but they had to
have something in the way of a rationalization of
their decision to do everything they could to stop the
completion of this investigation in the directions
that it was moving, which would have been an exposure
of this Carnegie Endowment story and the Ford
Foundation and the Guggenheim and the Rockefeller
Foundation, all working in harmony toward the control
of education in the United States. Well, to secure the
help of the White House in the picture, they got the
White House to cause the liaison personality between
the White House and the hill, a Major Person, to go up
to Hayes and try to get him to, as it were, actively
oppose what the investigation was engaged in. Hayes
very kindly then would listen to this visit from Major
Person; then he would call me and say, �Norm, come
up to my office. I have a good deal to tell you.� I
would go up. He would tell me, �I�ve just had a
visit from Major Person, and he wants me to break up
this investigation.� I then said, �Well, what did
you do� What did you say to him?� He said,� I
just told him to get the hell out.� He did that
three times, and I got pretty proud of him in the
sense that he was, as it were, backing me up. We
finally embarked upon the hearing at Hayes's request,
because he wanted to get them out of the way before he
went abroad for the summer.
ED
GRIFFIN
:
Why were the hearings finally terminated? What
happened to the Committee?
NORMAN
DODD:
What happened to the Committee or the hearings?
ED
GRIFFIN
:
The hearings.
NORMAN
DODD:
Oh, the hearings were terminated. Carol Reece was up
against such a furor with Hayes through the activity
of our own counsel. Hayes became convinced that he was
being double-crossed and he put on a show in a public
hearing room, Mr. Griffin, that was an absolute
disgrace. He called Carol Reece publicly every name in
the book, and Mr. Reece took this as proof that he
couldn't continue the hearings. He actually invited me
to accompany him when he went down to Hayes's office
and, in my presence with tears rolling down his face,
Hayes apologized to Carol Reece for what he had done
and his conduct, and apologized to me. I thought that
would be enough and that Carol would resume, but he
never did.
ED
GRIFFIN
:
The charge of anti-semitism is intriguing. What was
the basis of that charge? Was there a basis for it at
all?
NORMAN
DODD:
The basis of what the Republican National Committee
used was that the intelligence officer I�d taken on
my staff when I oriented this investigation to the
exposure and proof of a conspiracy was known to have a
book, and the book was deemed to be anti-semitic. This
was childish, but this was the second in command of
the Republican National Committee, and he told me
I�d have to dismiss this person from my staff.
ED
GRIFFIN
:
Who was that person?
NORMAN
DODD:
A Colonel Lee Lelane.
ED
GRIFFIN
:
And what was his book? Do you recall?
NORMAN
DODD:
The book they referred to was called Waters
Flowing Eastward, which was a castigation
of the Jewish influence in the world.
ED
GRIFFIN
:
What were some of the other charges made by Mr. Hayes
against Mr. Reece?
NORMAN
DODD:
Just that Mr. Reece was utilizing this investigation
for his own prominence inside the House of
Representatives. That was the only charge that Hayes
could think of.
ED
GRIFFIN
:
How would you describe the motivation of the people
who created the foundations, the big foundations, in
the very beginning? What was their motivation?
NORMAN
DODD:
Their motivation? Well, let's take Mr. Carnegie as an
example. He has publicly declared that his steadfast
interest was to counteract the departure of the
colonies from
Great Britain
. He was devoted to just putting the pieces back
together again.
ED
GRIFFIN
: Would
that have required the collectivism that they were
dedicated to?
NORMAN
DODD:
No, no, no. These policies, the foundations�
allegiance to these un-American concepts, are all
traceable to the transfer of the funds into the hands
of trustees, Mr. Griffin. It's not the men who had a
hand in the creation of the wealth that led to the
endowment for what we would call public purposes.
ED
GRIFFIN
:
It's a subversion of the original intent, then?
NORMAN
DODD:
Oh, yes, completely, and that�s how it got into the
world traditionally of bankers and lawyers.
ED
GRIFFIN
:
How do you see that the purpose and direction of the
major foundations has changed over the years to the
present? What is it today?
NORMAN
DODD:
Oh, it�s a hundred percent behind meeting the cost
of education such as it is presented through the
schools and colleges of the
United States
on the subject of our history as proving our original
ideas to be no longer practicable. The future belongs
to collectivistic concepts, and there's just no
disagreement on that.
ED
GRIFFIN
:
Why do the foundations generously support Communist
causes in the
United States
?
NORMAN
DODD:
Well, because to them, Communism represents a means of
developing what we call a monopoly, that is, an
organization of, say, a large-scale industry into an
administrable unit.
ED
GRIFFIN
:
Do they think that they will be the ones to benefit?
NORMAN
DODD:
They will be the beneficiaries of it, yes.
[END OF INTERVIEW]
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